

September 16, 2014

Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
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CAPE DOWNWINDERS & PILGRIM WATCH'S 2.206 PETITION TO MODIFY, SUSPEND, OR TAKE ANY OTHER ACTION TO THE OPERATING LICENSE OF PILGRIM STATION UNTIL THE NRC CAN ASSURE SUFFICIENT LAND-BASED SECURITY AT PILGRIM STATION IS IN PLACE TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE TO SATISFY ITS OBLIGATION TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH & SAFETY

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to §2.206 of Title 10 in the Code of Federal Regulations, Cape Downwinders (Hereafter "CD") and Pilgrim Watch (Hereinafter "PW") on behalf of their members request that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) institute a proceeding to modify, suspend or take any other action¹ as may be proper to the operating license of Pilgrim Station in order that the NRC can assure Pilgrim's onsite land-based security is upgraded so that checkpoints are manned at all times, and that surveillance of areas in the owner-controlled area insures that intruders will be detected and prevented entering. Petitioners show that owner-controlled area protections are eroded at Pilgrim Station and insufficient to thwart a potential attack.

This petition is filed shortly after both the anniversary of 9/11 and President Obama's September 10 speech that told the nation that ISIL threatened the homeland. The President confirmed what we already knew. There exists general threat environment for the US homeland; and the potential for a deliberate attack on a commercial nuclear reactor. Reactors

¹ NRC Enforcement actions include: notices of violation, civil penalties, orders, notice of nonconformance, confirmatory action letters, letters of reprimand, and demand for action.

have symbolic value and the capability of enormous destruction. Pilgrim is a symbolic target because it is located in America's Hometown. The consequence of a successful attack on Pilgrim could result in enormous consequences. Its spent fuel pool, for example, is vulnerable and a pool fire would have unimaginable consequences-up to \$488 billion dollars in damages and 24,000 latent cancers, estimated by the Massachusetts Attorney General.² Terrorist incidents are not limited to sub-national groups as evidenced by Timothy McVey, the Oklahoma Bomber.

Despite 9/11, sub-national groups, and Timothy McVey type attackers, access to Pilgrim Station's owner-controlled property is now easier to penetrate than after 9/11. The owner-controlled area protections are eroded. The guard house is unmanned and there is no visible security personnel around the perimeter of the owner-controlled areas. People can and do enter the owner-controlled area without a problem or detection. Our records, and they may be incomplete, show three trespassing events occurred in 2002, while security enhancements were being upgraded, and two trespassing events during 2003 and 2004. There were 10 events from July 2011 to September 2014. The threat has not decreased; however it appears that cut backs

² The Massachusetts Attorney General's Request for a Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene With respect to Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc.'s Application for Renewal of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plants Operating License and Petition for Backfit Order Requiring New Design features to Protect Against Spent Fuel Pool Accidents, Docket No. 50-293, May 26, 2006 includes a Report to The Massachusetts Attorney General On The Potential Consequences Of A Spent Fuel Pool Fire At The Pilgrim Or Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant, Jan Beyea, PhD., May 25, 2006. (Beyea Declaration, attachment); see also Consequence Study Of A Beyond Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting The Spent Fuel Pool For A U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor (October 2013) at 232 (Table 62) and 162 (table 33), Adams Accession NO ML13256A342) that showed that if even a small fraction of the inventory of a Peach Bottom reactor pool were released to the environment in a severe spent fuel pool accident, an average area of 9,400 square miles (24,300 square kilometers) would be rendered uninhabitable for decades, displacing as many as 4.1 million people.

on security have increased as an economy measure as Entergy finds it is losing money unable to compete with natural gas and renewable in New England's market economy.

Fifteen (15) trespassing events on Pilgrim's owner-controlled property provide the basis for this 2.206 petition.

Unlawful entry on nuclear reactor owner- controlled property cannot be dismissed as unimportant. NRC unjustifiably did so in a Press Release issued on Sept 10, 2014 in reference to an intrusion on Calvert Cliff's owner-controlled property. NRC's Public Relations piece said:

NRC requires nuclear power plant owners to take a graded approach to physical protection focusing on the areas most important to safety. For example, the area encompassing a nuclear power plant and its safety equipment is the Protected Area. NRC regulations require stringent access control measures before personnel and vehicles can enter a Protected Area. Within the Protected Area are the Vital Areas, which have even more access barriers and alarms to protect important equipment. All plants are required to have security checkpoints into the Protected Area. The outermost area, or the Owner-Controlled Area, does not have the same access control requirements and can be accessible by the public.

NRC wrongly implies that it is acceptable for licensees to drop manned checkpoints and security guards stationed around the periphery of the property and allow outsiders to wander around the property of a nuclear power plant.

Is the NRC unaware of the threat and the fact that there are weapons readily available that can do serious damage even when delivered from offsite? (Discussion below at B) Obviously those same available weapons delivered from close to the protective area fence line will increase the probability of causing serious damage.

Experts outside the NRC disagree with NRC's cavalier attitude. Dr. Edwin Lyman, a security expert at the Union of Concerned Scientists, explained³ that a visible security presence is vital, because it may deter terrorists from targeting a facility in the first place. Lyman said:

Part of security is to have a visible defense so that it doesn't attract adversaries who might see this kind of weakness to exploit...the industry has really let those owner-controlled areas protections just completely erode. And they're leaving the checkpoints unmanned all the time and not doing surveillance of the areas so people can enter the owner controlled area without any problem or detection. And I think that's a problem... I think it's kind of foolish to allow such lax controls over the owner-controlled area."

The threat against nuclear power plants is real. According to the 9/11 Commission report, the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorists initially considered attacking a nuclear power reactor.⁴

The remedy Petitioners seek is for the NRC to require Pilgrim to tighten security in its owner-controlled area, man checkpoints in the owner controlled area at all times, and perform visible and other surveillance measures so that people cannot enter the owner controlled area. This is necessary in order for NRC to fulfill its AEC mandate to protect public health and safety.

II. FACTUAL BASIS

A. Lack Sufficient Security Pilgrim's Owner-Controlled Area

Petitioners provide fifteen (15) trespassing or intrusion events on Pilgrim's owner-controlled property that provide the basis for this petition. The table below summarizes the events; each event is described in press reports. (Attachment A) The August 21, 2014 event is described in detail in a Declaration provided by the intruders.

³ <http://dailycaller.com/2014/09/08/thedc-investigates-lax-security-at-nuclear-power-plant-outside-washington-video/>

⁴ <http://www.resilience.org/stories/2004-07-25/911-report-reveals-al-qaeda-ringleader-contemplated-ny-area-nuclear-power-plant-p>

Table 1. Trespassing Events at Pilgrim (2002-2014)

DATE	NO. INCURSIONS	EVENT
07.08.02	3	Past 3 weeks, 3 instances trespassers: 2 instances teens sunbathing on beach in restricted area; 1 instance person in kayak who beached the kayak in the restricted area to sunbathe
09.30.03	1	3 Iranians walk along beach in restricted beach area
08.31.04	1	Connecticut man fishing from restricted area beach in front reactor
07.13.11	1	Norwegian boat Magnus moored inside restricted area overnight before investigated the next morning-Entergy did not follow or was unaware of protocol and notified the Harbormaster (who was not in the office to answer the phone) instead of the Police.
2013		
01.12.13	1	Duck hunters firing onsite – NRC Event Number 48669
06.13.13	1	Two women drove into property; parked in employee's parking lot; entered building; and when eventually discovered explained they wanted a tour.
07.29.2013	1	Couple arrested-walked through gate to waterfront
12.02.13	1	Woman arrested for trespassing at Pilgrim Station-drove into parking lot to hold sign
2014		
05.13.14	1	4 charged with trespassing, spring 2014
08.21.14	1	Diane Turco and Bill Mauer filmed by Ch 7 –walked down the drive, entered bldg, left after no response, <u>followed</u> 2 guards up drive. when left-guards were checking out Ch 7 truck parked on power house road. long time- no charges
08.31.14	1	2 New Hampshire men onsite said looking for overlook to Cape Cod Bay
09.03.14	1	2 Canadian men drove into parking lot said looking place fish
09.12.14	1	Beach-lovers arrested on Pilgrim's restricted beach

The events summarized in the table clearly show people can enter the owner controlled area without any problem or detection, and remain onsite for a period time that would allow intruders determined to inflict harm to cause damage.

The press reports covered: intruders driving through the front gate, passing the unmanned guardhouse; parking in the worker's parking lot, not far from a nuclear reactor; entering the unmanned worker check-in building, observing workers entering security codes; sunbathing or fishing on the "restricted" waterfront; duck hunting on the property with live ammunition; anchoring a large sailboat inside the 500-yard exclusion zone and spending the night there un-disturbed and apparently un-noticed by security.

Entergy prides itself for eventually catching the trespassers, sometimes hours later. But the real issue is that trespassers were on the property in the first place; and not only on the property, but in close proximity to the "protected area."

If the trespassers had been intent on causing destruction, working alone or in tandem, and had been armed with today's available high-powered weapons, very bad consequences could have occurred. To say that it has not happened yet; is not saying it will not happen.

August 21, 2014 Trespassing Incident

The following description of the incident was prepared by the two trespassers Diane Turco and Bill Mauer, both petitioners. It clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of Pilgrim to a hostile action event. (Original copy and declaration, Attachment B, Entergy's post-trespassing Police Report, Attachment C)

Below, the trespasser's declaration is broken into paragraphs. Highlighted text and comments are inserted.

We, Bill Maurer and Diane Turco, met for an on camera interview with Cheryl Fiandaca from WHDH Boston Channel 7 NEWS Team on Thursday August 21, 2014 at the intersection of Rocky Hill Road (a town road) and the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Edison) Access Road (a private road owned by Entergy) in Plymouth, Massachusetts, across from the open gated entrance to the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

This was arranged as a Channel 7 follow up to their story on the lack of security at Seabrook Nuclear Power Station in New Hampshire.

When the interview was completed, we volunteered to walk up the driveway (Access Road) towards the reactor, past the “No Trespassing” signs and guard house to show as an example there is no security in effect in those areas. A few cars drove by and we exchanged waved greetings and acknowledgements. Then we continued past the closed and unmanned guard house towards the reactor and the security check in building (employee entrance). At this point we were out of sight of the Channel 7 crew.

When we were about 50 feet away from the Access Control Building, we passed two security guards who were walking towards us but on the opposite side of the driveway. They appeared to not notice us as we were not stopped nor questioned.

Comment: If Diane and Bill had weapons, they could have shot the guards. At this point Diane and Bill were in sight of the reactor building and had been since a bend in the road, about 300 feet from the Access Control Building.



Comment: The tan building is where Diane and Bill walked into the Access Control Building.

When we entered the front building (Access Control), some workers entered their codes and looked at us with no verbal exchange. They then entered the reactor area through the gated entrance.

Comment: Bill and Diane did not observe whether the security code system used modern bio-scan technology. Also they questioned whether a trained intruder inside the Access Control Building like themselves observing workers entering their codes could determine what the codes were to use at a later date for access.

In this building there was a red phone in the lobby so Bill picked it up to call and see if we could get a tour, however, no one answered. We stayed inside that building for a few minutes.

Considering the WHDH Channel 7 crew was out on the Rocky Hill Road, a town road so as not to be in a position of trespassing, and we had been out of their line of sight for about 20 minutes, we began our walk back.

Comment: Twenty minutes was ample time for a malicious intruder to have caused serious trouble

Up in front of us were the two security guards we previously passed, walking at a casual pace. They walked by the upper parking lot and empty guard house and when we turned the bend in the Access Road to see the Channel 7 crew, the two security guards continued walking towards Rocky Hill Road. As we approached the straightway section of the Access Road, the two security men were still in front of us by about 100 yards.

Comment: At this point the guards still did not know that Diane and Bill were trespassers and on the property behind them. In the oft chance that they really did know, security personnel should be trained to walk behind intruders, not in front. It might be important for the security personnel to see what the intruders are doing.

Then we noticed another man along with a security officer with a huge gun over his shoulder and both were standing with the Channel 7 crew out on Rocky Hill Road.

At this point, we were walking behind the security guards on Entergy property. The film crew recorded the entire event.

We were all rather shocked that unknown folks would have access to the property and not be noticed by security for over 20 plus minutes and be on Entergy property behind unaware security.

Ultimately, we walked on to Rocky Hill Road (public property) and Entergy security told the Channel 7 crew (one reporter and one cameraman) and us to leave. The crew filmed the entire event.

Given the state of the world and acknowledged terrorist potential for attack of nuclear power reactors, it appears that the this first layer of security is primarily theater designed only to dissuade only the most timid of sight -seeing nuisances.

Even walking by security and then using the in-house phone system, we couldn't engage anyone's interest or curiosity. That we were positioned between security and the reactor is a grave concern. Also, the total length of time we were clearly visible to any security while out on the street during the interview and on the property was over 45 minutes.

Comment: Forty-five minutes is ample time for knowledgeable intruders to take the reactor down. This was demonstrated in a drill at Pilgrim Station; and in testimony by Dr. Edwin Lyman to the US Senate discussed below.

This brings into serious question the efficacy of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station's security systems. The grounds are open for access to anyone for lengths of time without interference.

Dr. Edwin Lyman from the Union of Concerns Scientists has stated in testimony submitted to the US Senate; “If a team of well-trained terrorists were to succeed in gaining forced entry to a nuclear power plant, within a matter of minutes it could do enough damage to cause a meltdown of the core and a failure of the containment structure.”

We understand that Entergy needs only to follow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, and given the state of affairs, the lack of security for the grounds of Pilgrim Nuclear with easy access to the employee entrance building and vulnerable spent fuel pool are woefully inadequate whether regulated or not.

We allege the security around the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station would not prevent access for damage to the reactor/spent fuel pool by those who may have ill intent with consequences that would be catastrophic for the state of Massachusetts. We request the Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigate the security at Pilgrim for the community at large, the population at risk.

What does this incident show?



1. The picture shows they were in close proximity to the protected area. At that location, an intruder could cause serious damage with today's readily available weapons.
2. Their account shows that, if they were "bad guys," they could have taken down four security men, significantly cutting down the available security personnel onsite.
 - As Diane and Bill walked down the driveway to the access control structure, two security men walked up the driveway passing without comment-two security personnel potentially and easily down.
 - When Diane and Bill left the access control building to exit the property, they walked behind two security personnel investigating the unmarked Channel 7 van two security personnel potentially and easily down.-
3. In the Access Control Building, Diane and Bill could have forcibly piggybacked their entrance with the employees' entrances after the employees had cleared the security screening allowing their entrance.
4. The Channel 7 news crew remained at the intersection while their SUVs remained parked 300 yards from the intersection in the southerly direction down Rocky Hill Road without any investigation by Entergy personnel into its purpose. The SUV could have

been part of an attack team. Bill and Diane were on the property the same length of time.

5. Dr. Edwin Lyman from the Union of Concerns Scientists has stated in testimony submitted to the US Senate; “If a team of well-trained terrorists were to succeed in gaining forced entry to a nuclear power plant, within a matter of minutes it could do enough damage to cause a meltdown of the core and a failure of the containment structure.”

Fortunately this was simply an investigation for the news media that caused no harm, excepting to Entergy’s and the NRC’s public relations. Petitioners hope that the incident may cause some good by pointing out serious vulnerabilities that will lead to mitigation.

B. POTENTIAL FOR ATTACK-WEAPONS AVAILABLE TODAY

We know that there is a potential for a deliberate attack either from a terrorist group or from an attacker similar to Timothy McVey, the Oklahoma bomber. We know that reactors are attractive targets because they are provided with a defense that is “light” from a military sense, serve as symbolic targets and release from a reactor could create severe consequences. Pilgrim is located in “America’s Hometown, making it especially symbolic, and both the locations and density of its spent fuel pool could guarantee unimaginable devastation. We know there is easy access to the owner-protected area, and intruders can remain for a length of time sufficient to cause a disaster. Last, we know there are weapons readily available today to cause destruction and release of radioactive material into the environment. Here we rely on testimony from Dr.

Gordon Thompson on record with the NRC.⁵ Some self-explanatory pertinent highlights are summarized in the following tables.

Table 7-4 (Thompson Waste Conf., pg., 80)
Some Potential Modes and Instruments of Attack on a US Nuclear Power Plant

Attack Mode/Instrument	Characteristics	Present Defense
Commando-style attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could involve heavy weapons and sophisticated tactics • Successful attack would require substantial planning and resources 	Alarms, fences and lightly-armed guards, with offsite backup
Land-vehicle bomb	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Readily obtainable • Highly destructive if detonated at target 	Vehicle barriers at entry points to Protected Area
Anti-tank missile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Readily obtainable • Highly destructive at point of impact 	None if missile launched from offsite
Commercial aircraft	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More difficult to obtain than pre-9/11 • Can destroy larger, softer targets 	None
Explosive-laden smaller aircraft	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Readily obtainable • Can destroy smaller, harder targets 	None
10-kilotonne nuclear weapon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficult to obtain • Assured destruction if detonated at target 	None

Notes:

This table is adapted from Table 7-4 of: Thompson, 2007c. Sources supporting this table include:

(a) Jim Wells, US Government Accountability Office, testimony before the

⁵ Environmental Impacts of Storing Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste from Commercial Nuclear Reactors: A Critique of NRC's Waste Confidence Decision and Environmental Impact Determination, Dr. Gordon Thompson, Feb 6, 2009; Declaration of 1 August 2013 by Gordon R. Thompson: Comments on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Draft Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a US Mark I Boiling Water Reactor

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, US House Committee on Government Reform, 4 April 2006.

(b) Marvin Fertel, Nuclear Energy Institute, testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, US House Committee on Government Reform, 4 April 2006.

(c) Danielle Brian, Project on Government Oversight, letter to NRC chair Nils J. Diaz, 22 February 2006.

(d) National Research Council, *Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report*, National Academies Press, 2006.

Table 7-6 (Thompson, Final Waste Confidence Report 02.06.09, pg., 82)
The Shaped Charge as a Potential Instrument of Attack

Category of Information	Selected Information in Category
General information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shaped charges have many civilian and military applications, and have been used for decades • Applications include human-carried demolition charges or warheads for anti-tank missiles • Construction and use does not require assistance from a government or access to classified information
Use in World War II	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The German MISTEL, designed to be carried in the nose of an un-manned bomber aircraft, is the largest known shaped charge • Japan used a smaller version of this device, the SAKURA bomb, for kamikaze attacks against US warships
A large, contemporary device	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developed by a US government laboratory for mounting in the nose of a cruise missile • Described in an unclassified, published report (citation is voluntarily withheld here) • Purpose is to penetrate large thicknesses of rock or concrete as the first stage of a "tandem" warhead • Configuration is a cylinder with a diameter of 71 cm and a length of 72 cm • When tested in November 2002, created a hole of 25 cm diameter in tuff rock to a depth of 5.9 m • Device has a mass of 410 kg; would be within the payload capacity of many general-aviation aircraft
A potential delivery vehicle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A Beechcraft King Air 90 general-aviation aircraft will carry a payload of up to 990 kg at a speed of up to 460 km/hr • A used King Air 90 can be purchased in the US for \$0.4-1.0 million

Source:

This table is adapted from Table 7-6 of: Thompson, 2007c.

Table 7-7
Performance of US Army Shaped Charges, M3 and M2A3 (Ibid., pg., 83)

Target Material	Indicator	Type of Shaped Charge	
		M3	M2A3
Reinforced concrete	Maximum wall thickness that can be perforated	60 in	36 in
	Depth of penetration in thick walls	60 in	30 in
	Diameter of hole	• 5 in at entrance • 2 in minimum	• 3.5 in at entrance • 2 in minimum
	Depth of hole with second charge placed over first hole	84 in	45 in
Armor plate	Perforation	At least 20 in	12 in
	Average diameter of hole	2.5 in	1.5 in

Notes:

(a) Data are from: Army, 1967, pp 13-15 and page 100.

(b) The M2A3 charge has a mass of 12 lb, a maximum diameter of 7 in, and a total length of 15 in including the standoff ring.

(c) The M3 charge has a mass of 30 lb, a maximum diameter of 9 in, a charge length of 15.5 in, and a standoff pedestal 15 in long.

Table 7-8 (Ibid., pg., 84)
Types of Atmospheric Release from a Spent-Fuel-Storage Module at an ISFSI as a Result of a Potential Attack

Type of Event	Module Behavior	Relevant Instruments and Modes of Attack	Characteristics of Atmospheric Release
Type I: Vaporization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Entire module is vaporized 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Module is within the fireball of a nuclear-weapon explosion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radioactive content of module is lofted into the atmosphere and amplifies fallout from nuc. explosion
Type II: Rupture and Dispersal (Large)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MPC and overpack are broken open • Fuel is dislodged from MPC and broken apart • Some ignition of zircaloy fuel cladding may occur, without sustained combustion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aerial bombing • Artillery, rockets, etc. • Effects of blast etc. outside the fireball of a nuclear weapon explosion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Solid pieces of various sizes are scattered in vicinity • Gases and small particles form an aerial plume that travels downwind • Some release of volatile species (esp. cesium-137) if incendiary effects occur
Type III: Rupture and Dispersal (Small)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MPC and overpack are ruptured but retain basic shape • Fuel is damaged but most rods retain basic shape • No combustion inside MPC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vehicle bomb • Impact by commercial aircraft • Perforation by shaped charge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scattering and plume formation as for Type II event, but involving smaller amounts of material • Little release of volatile species
Type IV: Rupture and Combustion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MPC is ruptured, allowing air ingress and egress • Zircaloy fuel cladding is ignited and combustion propagates within the MPC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Missiles with tandem warheads • Close-up use of shaped charges and incendiary devices • Thermic lance • Removal of overpack lid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scattering and plume formation as for Type III event • Substantial release of volatile species, exceeding amounts for Type II release

Table 8-1 (Ibid, pg., 87)
 Selected Approaches to Protecting US Critical Infrastructure from Attack by Sub-National Groups, and Some of the Strengths and Weaknesses of these Approaches

Approach	Strengths	Weaknesses
Offensive military operations internationally	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could deter or prevent governments from supporting sub-national groups hostile to the USA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could promote growth of sub-national groups hostile to the USA, and build sympathy for these groups in foreign populations • Could be costly in terms of lives, money and national reputation
International police cooperation within a legal framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could identify and intercept potential attackers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation could be slow and/or incomplete • Requires ongoing international cooperation
Surveillance and control of the domestic population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could identify and intercept potential attackers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could destroy civil liberties, leading to political, social and economic decline
Secrecy about design and operation of infrastructure facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could prevent attackers from identifying points of vulnerability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could suppress a true understanding of risk • Could contribute to political, social and economic decline
Active defense of infrastructure facilities (by use of guards, guns, gates,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could stop attackers before they reach the target 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires ongoing expenditure & vigilance • May require military involvement
Resilient design, passive defense, and related protective measures for infrastructure facilities (as envisioned in the NIPP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could allow target to survive attack without damage, thereby enhancing protective deterrence • Could substitute for other protective approaches, avoiding their costs and adverse impacts • Could reduce risks from accidents & natural hazards 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could involve higher capital costs

III. CONCLUSION

The fifteen reports of intrusions onto Pilgrim's owner-controlled property support our allegation that public health and safety are at risk due to eroded owner-controlled area protections that allow intruders to enter the area without any problem or detection, either by land or boat. If any of those intruders were trained sub-nationals or individuals equipped to cause harm, working alone or in tandem with others, America's Hometown and the Commonwealth would be a very different place today.

Dr. Edwin Lyman from the Union of Concerns Scientists stated in testimony submitted to the US Senate:

If a team of well-trained terrorists were to succeed in gaining forced entry to a nuclear power plant, within a matter of minutes it could do enough damage to cause a meltdown of the core and a failure of the containment structure.”

The President warned of an increased threat from ISIL on September 10. He knows, we know, that more not less security is required. Owner-controlled protections have eroded no doubt tied to Entergy's economic woes⁶.

Dr. Edwin Lyman, a security expert at the Union of Concerned Scientists, explained⁷ a visible security presence is vital, because it may deter terrorists from targeting a facility in the first place. Lyman said, and we agree that,

Part of security is to have a visible defense so that it doesn't attract adversaries who might see this kind of weakness to exploit...the industry has really let those owner-controlled areas protections just completely erode. And they're leaving the checkpoints unmanned all the time and not doing surveillance of the areas so people can enter the

⁶ Petition To The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Requesting Enforcement Action Against Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc; Entergy Nuclear Fitzpatrick, LLC; Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC; And Entergy Generation Co., March 18, 2013 And Supplements 1-5.

⁷ <http://dailycaller.com/2014/09/08/thedc-investigates-lax-security-at-nuclear-power-plant-outside-washington-video/>

owner controlled area without any problem or detection. And I think that's a problem... I think it's kind of foolish to allow such lax controls over the owner-controlled area."

Petitioners remind the Board that, Judge Rosenthal of the ASLB accurately said that, with one possible exception, the NRC had not granted a section 2.206 petitioner the substantive relief it sought for at least 37 years. Judge Rosenthal concluded that, "where truly substantive relief is being sought (i.e., some affirmative administrative action taken with respect to the licensee or license), there should be no room for a belief on the requester's part that the pursuit of such a course is either being encouraged by Commission officialdom or has a fair chance of success."⁸

We truly hope that Judge Rosenthal will be proven wrong and this petition will be granted.

Respectfully submitted on September 16, 2014,

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⁸ Memorandum And Order (Denying Petitions For Hearing), LBP-12-14, July 10, 2012, Additional Comments of Judge Rosenthal (See NRC's EHD Docket EA-12-05-/12-51)

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

News Reports- Pilgrim Trespassing Events

2002

From: Ron DesJarlais <rdesjar@ledger.com>;
Date: Wednesday, July 24, 2002 10:27 AM
To: 'lampert@adelphia.net' <lampert@adelphia.net>;
Subject:

Kayaker nabbed at power plant

By TAMARA RACE

The Patriot Ledger

The "no trespassing" buoys have been in the water in front of the Pilgrim nuclear power plant for less than a week and already police have arrested a kayaker, charging him with breaching the restricted zone.

Peter F. Walsh Jr., 39, of Whitinsville, paddled past the buoys, pulled his kayak onto the beach in front of the plant and sat in the sun at about 4:30 p.m. Monday, according to police.

"He said he was working on his tan," Capt. Charles Chandler said.

Pilgrim security guards saw Walsh paddle onto the beach, according to plant spokesman David Tarantino.

"They met him there along with Plymouth police and questioned him," Tarantino said.

Walsh told guards he was renting a cottage on White Horse Beach and has always done this.

"He claimed he didn't see the buoys," Tarantino said.

The 12 buoys are marked "Restricted Area" in big orange letters with orange diamonds, the marine equivalent of a "no trespassing" sign, Tarantino said.

Police searched the kayak but found nothing, according to Tarantino.

Walsh was charged with trespassing.

Before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the waterfront near the plant was a popular public fishing area, but Entergy officials closed it off in October as part of increased security measures.

Coast Guard officials created a 500-yard restricted zone in the waters off the plant to keep boaters and fishermen away from Pilgrim's intake pipes.

The buoy markers were installed last week.

Tarantino said Walsh appeared harmless.

It's the third trespassing incident in as many weeks at the plant, but the first arrest.

Last week, police cleared two groups of teenagers from the beach and jetties near the plant. The youths had wandered past no trespassing signs to access the beach.

Police took the teens home and spoke with their parents.

Entergy officials are increasing security patrols for the July Fourth holiday to prevent further trespassing incidents, Tarantino said.

"While there has been no specific threat against any nuclear power plant, federal investigators have received vague threats that terrorists might strike on the nation's holiday," Tarantino said. "We have added additional security patrols around the plant for the holiday weekend."

Tarantino said the plant is already operating at its highest level of security, as it has been since September's attacks.

2003

Three Iranian immigrants arrested at Pilgrim nuclear plant in Plymouth

By Maureen Boyle, ENTERPRISE STAFF WRITER sept 30, 20013

PLYMOUTH — Three men caught with camera equipment on the grounds surrounding the nuclear power plant were arrested and interrogated by federal and local authorities.

The trio, who police say came to the United States as teenagers from Iran, were spotted at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Saturday morning walking along a restricted beach near the plant. They were arrested on trespassing charges. The men told authorities they were hiking.

"It sounded at first a little ominous," said David F. Tarantino, spokesman for Entergy, owner of the plant. "The beach is very difficult to navigate. It is not like a stroll along a sandy beach. It is a beach with big boulders and rocks. It is really a tough exercise to navigate."

The men told authorities they were touring Plymouth, he said. "They said they like to hike and they were hiking along the shore," he said.

Fariborz Motamedi, 42, of 23 Panettieri Drive, Lakeville; Amir M. Lashgari, 41, of 2001 Marina Drive, Quincy, and Hamid H. Ahmadi, 49, of 7 Brahman Drive, Norton, were arrested, charged and later released after extensive questioning by authorities.

Attempts to reach the three men this morning were unsuccessful.

A phone number listed to Motamedi in Taunton was disconnected and there was no listing for him in Lakeville. There was no phone listing for Ahmadi in Norton. The number of Lashgari in Quincy was nonpublished.

Plant security staff first noticed the three men as they neared the posted restricted area and stopped them when they got in, Tarantino said.

"They had been under constant surveillance," he said.

Plymouth police and the FBI were called in and digital camera equipment the men had with them was confiscated, he said.

Authorities examined all the photographs, he said. There were no known photographs of the plant taken, he said.

The men told police they parked at White Horse Beach and hiked onto the grounds. Police said the men had been in town before in the last two weeks.

Tarantino said security surrounding the plant has been increased since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. There have been several arrests of people who have crossed into the restricted area, either by land or water, he said. Those cases included a person in a kayak who landed on the beach and fishermen who strayed into restricted waters.

"Our policy is to arrest," Tarantino said of anyone who strays into the restricted area surrounding the plant.

2004

Conn fisherman arrested at Pilgrim

Patriot Ledger, Tuesday, August 31, 2004 page 21

PLYMOUTH- Police have charged a Connecticut man with trespassing on Pilgrim nuclear power plant property.

Police said Kyle E. Firmender, 28, of Bridgeport Conn., wearing a bathing suit and sandals, was fishing on the waterfront in front of the plant at about noon Sunday.

The area was marked with no trespassing signs, but Firmender told police he did not see them.

He was arrested after he was unable to produce identification, Capt. Michael Botieri said.

Judge Gregory Baler continued the charge without a finding after Firmender pleaded innocent during his arraignment yesterday in Plymouth District Court.

Botieri said the incident appeared to be an innocent mistake, but Firmender's name was turned over to FBI officials, according to policy.

2011

And while the children were asleep....

Special welcome for the Magnus

Sailboat detained, FBI called, after anchoring off Pilgrim Station



Wicked Local photo/Frank Mand

The Norwegian crew of the Magnus got an unexpectedly hearty reception from the local harbormaster, police, Coast Guard, customs officials and FBI when they - apparently inadvertently - anchored too close to the Pilgrim nuclear power plant Monday night.

By Frank Mand

Wicked Local Plymouth

Posted Jul 13, 2011 @ 08:00 AM

PLYMOUTH —

Three sailors arrived in Plymouth waters in the wee hours of Tuesday morning, and got a far bigger reception than they had expected.

The three – including Captain and owner Erling Viksund of Bergen Norway – were nearing the Massachusetts coast in their small sailboat when, following maritime protocol, they contacted the Coast Guard.

Shortly thereafter however - as they tried to maneuver through the shoals and shallows of the bay - they lost their engine and were unable to navigate safely into the harbor in the darkness.

Seeing the relatively sheltered waters south of Plymouth center - where the lights of some kind of large facility seemed at the time welcoming, they made for that area under sail and, after maneuvering back and forth for a while in stiff winds, managed to set their anchor.

They had sailed all the way from Nova Scotia, taking a circuitous route out beyond the Cape, and had faced rough weather as they made their way into Plymouth Bay.

When they were finally anchored - sometime around three a.m. - all three men passed out from exhaustion.

Their choice of anchorage was however, in close proximity to the prohibited zone in the waters off the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

While they slept on the Magnus, Entergy officials became aware of their presence and notified the harbormaster and the Coast Guard of their presence.

Pilgrim Watch Director Mary Lampert told the Old Colony that her sources indicate that the Magnus was not immediately noticed by plant security, and was anchored there for hours before the harbormaster and coast guard were notified.

Regardless, once an incursion into the prohibited zones around the plant is reported, the protocol local officials follow includes notification of the FBI.

They woke, Erling says, to a beautiful day but moment later were surprised to hear the bleating of horns as the harbormaster and Coast Guard came abreast of the Magnus.

They were detained - escorted into Plymouth Harbor - where just before noon Tuesday a flotilla of small craft brought local police, the harbormaster, FBI agents and customs officials to the Magnus to interview them and assess their status.

Later that day Plymouth Police Chief Michael Botieri told the Old Colony that they do not believe that the crew of the Magnus was deliberately probing the waters off the power plant but, rather, it was just an unfortunate set of coincidences.

The Magnus' captain was himself, magnanimous, praising the organization of those who greeted them. Entergy officials do not comment directly on security matters, but Entergy Vice President Jack Alexander told the Old Colony that there was never any real threat to the plant.

“We did observe the vessel approach the legal exclusion zone and notified the appropriate federal and local authorities, who responded according to protocol,” Alexander explained. “The vessel and its occupants were taken into custody and removed from the exclusion area.”

This is the second incursion into prohibited waters near the power plant in less than a week. Six days ago several fishermen were arrested after entering the prohibited area and then fishing off the jetty by the plant.

Look to the weekend edition of the Old Colony for an interview with the "Three Vikings of the Magnus." [Copyright 2011 Wicked Local Plymouth. Some rights reserved](#)

Read more: [Special welcome for the Magnus - Plymouth, MA - Wicked Local Plymouth](#)
<http://www.wickedlocal.com/plymouth/archive/x401790840/Special-welcome-for-the-Magnus#ixzz1SHDT8x4u>

2012

01.12.13 –Event 48669 Potential Security- Hostile Action- Duck Hunters

Duck hunters ruffle some feathers at Pilgrim Station

By: [MATTHEW NADLER](#) | January 14, 2013

<http://manometcurrent.com/duck-hunters-ruffle-some-feathers-at-pilgrim-station/>

A pair of duck hunters caused a security scare at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Saturday morning. According to Capt. John Rogers, security at the plant were alerted by the sound of gun shots and notified the authorities. The pair were out on the water, but never entered the exclusion zone.

Nonetheless, the harbormaster escorted them to Plymouth Harbor where their credentials were checked out. They were then sent on their way.

A press release from Pilgrim stated the plant remained secure during the investigation of the incident.

Duck hunters trigger brief scare at Plymouth nuclear plant

By **Todd Feathers**

Globe Correspondent January 14, 2013 12:42 PM

A pair of duck hunters caused a minor scare at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth early Saturday when security personnel at the plant heard gunfire coming from Cape Cod Bay, officials said today.

According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Plymouth police, the two hunters were licensed to carry firearms and to hunt, and were not inside the marked-off security zone surrounding the plant on the bay side of the facility operated by the Entergy company.

But the operators at the Plymouth plant did not know they were hunters right away and after hearing gunshots coming from the waters nearby, plant security officials reported an “unusual event” to the NRC, the Coast Guard, and Plymouth police.

Responding police quickly identified the hunters and verified they were in the area legally, Plymouth Police Chief Michael E. Botieri said.

Because nuclear power plants are sensitive locations, security and law enforcement officers respond quickly and thoroughly to every perceived threat, no matter how small, NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan said.

The plant was already shut down at the time of the shooting, Sheehan said, because workers were fixing a water pump that had been leaking.

Todd Feathers can be reached at todd.feathers@globe.com. Follow him on Twitter at [@ToddFeathers](https://twitter.com/ToddFeathers).

2013

Couple charged with trespassing at Plymouth nuclear plant
Two people walked through the main gates of Pilgrim Station Saturday and made their way to the waterfront of the nuclear power plant before being detained by security guards.

By Rich Harbert

Posted Jul. 29, 2013 @ 12:01 am

Updated Jul 29, 2013 at 7:27 PM

PLYMOUTH

Two people walked through the main gates of Pilgrim Station Saturday and made their way to the waterfront of the nuclear power plant before being detained by security guards.

The 29-year-old man and 24-year-old woman, both South Plymouth residents, told police they wanted to go to the beach to watch the sunset. They were charged shortly after 8:30 p.m. with trespassing.

Woman arrested for trespassing at Pilgrim Station

By: **MATTHEW NADLER** | December 2, 2013 Manomet Current

A Brockton woman was arrested Friday at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station after staging what appeared to be a solo protest.

According to Captain John Rogers, the 57-year-old woman reportedly drove past the main entrance, then parked her car and allegedly took a photo of herself holding a sign referencing the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. Rogers said the woman claimed her action was part of a protest action called Yellow and Black Friday.

A website called [The Post Ignorance Project](#) encouraged people to take part in the event on Friday by visiting a nuclear power plant and holding a sign in front of it. The website also advised people not to go on plant property.

The suspect was charged with trespassing and released on her own recognizance.

2014

Trespassers arrested at Pilgrim Station

By: MATTHEW NADLER | September 2, 2014

<http://manometcurrent.com/trespassers-arrested-pilgrim-station/>

Two New Hampshire men were arrested for trespassing at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station on Sunday.

According to Captain John Rogers, the pair, ages 55 and 40, were found in their car in the parking lot after driving past the warning signs at the main entrance. They later admitted seeing the signs, Rogers said.

The two said they were looking for the now-closed waterfront path.

More trespassers at Plymouth nuclear plant

PLYMOUTH – For the second time in less than three days, two people have been charged with trespassing at Pilgrim station, the nuclear power plant in Manomet.

Rich Harbert Reporter

Posted Sep. 3, 2014 @ 2:38 pm

Updated Sep 3, 2014 at 5:22 PM <http://www.patriotledger.com/article/20140903/NEWS/140908959>

PLYMOUTH – For the second time in less than three days, two people have been charged with trespassing at Pilgrim station, the nuclear power plant in Manomet.

Police said two men, 72- and 67-year-old brothers from Quebec, Canada, disregarded no trespassing warnings shortly before 8 a.m. Tuesday and drove into the plant's main parking lot.

Security guards detained the men for police. The men said they were looking for a place to go fishing.

On Sunday, two New Hampshire men were similarly arrested after disregarding no trespassing warnings.

The New Hampshire men told police they were trying to find an overlook.

The plant once allowed the public onto its property to fish and visit an overlook near the shore. The property has been posted against trespassing for more than a decade

Connecticut couple arrested at Pilgrim Station

By: MATTHEW NADLER | September 12, 2014

<http://manometcurrent.com/connecticut-couple-arrested-pilgrim-station/#more-16869>

Another pair of alleged beach lovers were arrested at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Thursday.

According to Captain John Rogers, a married couple from Waterbury, Connecticut was found in a back lot of the power plant, having presumably driven by numerous trespassing warnings. They were detained by plant security until police arrived.

One of them, a 58-year-old woman, was also allegedly found in possession of proscription drugs that were not her own, Rogers said.

The two, according to Rogers, said they stopped at the power plant to see the water.

Police charged the woman with trespassing, two counts of possession of a class E substance and one count of possession of a class C substance. her husband, age 62, was charged with trespassing.

APPENDIX B

Declaration Diane Turco and William MauerUNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONBefore The Executive Operator of OperationsIn the Matter of
2.206 Enforcement Petition

September 15, 2014

We, Diane Turco and William Mauer declare that under penalty of perjury that our following description of the trespassing event on Pilgrim Station's owner-controlled property on August 21, 2014 is true and correct to the best of our knowledge.

We, Bill Maurer and Diane Turco, met for an on camera interview with Cheryl Fiandaca from WHDH Boston Channel 7 NEWS Team on Thursday August 21, 2014 at the intersection of Rocky Hill Road (a town road) and the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Edison) Access Road (a private road owned by Entergy) in Plymouth, Massachusetts, across from the open gated entrance to the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. This was arranged as a Channel 7 follow up to their story on the lack of security at Seabrook Nuclear Power Station in New Hampshire.

When the interview was completed, we volunteered to walk up the driveway (Access Road) towards the reactor, past the "No Trespassing" signs and guard house to show as an example there is no security in effect in those areas. A few cars drove by and we exchanged waved greetings and acknowledgements. Then we continued past the closed and unmanned guard house towards the reactor and the security check in building (employee entrance). At this point we were out of sight of the Channel 7 crew. When we were about 50 feet away from the Access Control Building, we passed two security guards who were walking towards us but on the opposite side of the driveway. They appeared to not notice us as we were not stopped nor questioned.

When we entered the front building (Access Control), some workers entered their codes and looked at us with no verbal exchange. They then entered the reactor area through the gated entrance. In this building there was a red phone in the lobby so Bill picked it up to call and see if we could get a tour, however, no one answered. We stayed inside that building for a few minutes.

Considering the WHDH Channel 7 crew was out on the Rocky Hill Road, a town road so as not to be in a position of trespassing, and we had been out of their line of sight for about 20 minutes, we began our walk back. Up in front of us were the two security guards we previously passed, walking at a casual pace. They walked by the upper parking lot and empty guard house and when we turned the bend in the Access Road to see the Channel 7 crew, the two security guards continued walking towards Rocky Hill Road. As we approached the straightway section of the Access Road, the two security men were still in front of us by about 100 yards. Then we noticed another man along with a security officer with a huge gun over his shoulder and both were standing with the Channel 7 crew out on Rocky Hill Road. At this point, we were walking behind the security guards on Entergy

property. The film crew recorded the entire event. We were all rather shocked that unknown folks would have access to the property and not be noticed by security for over 20 plus minutes and be on Entergy property behind unaware security. Ultimately, we walked on to Rocky Hill Road (public property) and Entergy security told the Channel 7 crew (one reporter and one cameraman) and us to leave. The crew filmed the entire event.

Given the state of the world and acknowledged terrorist potential for attack of nuclear power reactors, it appears that the this first layer of security is primarily theater designed only to dissuade only the most timid of sight -seeing nuisances. Even walking by security and then using the in-house phone system, we couldn't engage anyone's interest or curiosity. That we were positioned between security and the reactor is a grave concern. Also, the total length of time we were clearly visible to any security while out on the street during the interview and on the property was over 45 minutes. This brings into serious question the efficacy of the first layer of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station's security systems. The grounds are open for access to anyone for lengths of time without interference.

Dr. Edwin Lyman from the Union of Concerns Scientists has stated in testimony submitted to the US Senate; "If a team of well-trained terrorists were to succeed in gaining forced entry to a nuclear power plant, within a matter of minutes it could do enough damage to cause a meltdown of the core and a failure of the containment structure."

We understand that Entergy needs only to follow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, and given the state of affairs, the lack of security for the grounds of Pilgrim Nuclear with easy access to the employee entrance building and vulnerable spent fuel pool are woefully inadequate whether regulated or not.

We allege the security around the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station would not prevent access for damage to the reactor/spent fuel pool by those who may have ill intent with consequences that would be catastrophic for the state of Massachusetts. We request the Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigate the security at Pilgrim for the community at large, the population at risk.

Respectfully,

(Signature provided on mailed copy)

Diane Turco
Cape Downwinders
157 Long Road
Harwich, MA 02645
Tel 508-776-3132
Email: tturco@comcast
September 16, 2014

(Signature provided on mailed copy)

William Maurer
Cape Downwinders
140 Gifford Street
Falmouth, MA 02540
Tel. 508-548-6221
Email: wmmaurer@comcast.net
September 16, 2014

APPENDIX C

Entergy's Report to Town of Plymouth Police

Plymouth Police Department
 20 Long Pond Rd
 Plymouth, MA 02360
 (508) 830-4218

Incident Number: 2014000020285
 File No: N/A
 Dispatch Incident Number: 2014000020285
 Print Date: September 8, 2014
 Printed By: esser

Incident Report

Narratives for Incident Number 2014000020285 ? Yes

Other Narratives not authorized for print? None

Narratives this user authorized to print:

Narrative by: Clifton Brant (59CB) Division: Patrol/Detectives

<u>Date & Time</u>	<u>Narrative Description</u>	<u>Entered by</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Reviewed by</u>	<u>Last Edit Date</u>
08/21/2014 19:47		Clifton Brant (59CB)	Open		08/22/2014

On August 21st at approximately 15:59, this Officer in Car 19 was dispatched to 600 Rocky Hill Road, Pilgrim Nuclear/Entergy plant for a past trespass incident. Upon my arrival, I met the caller Security Superintendent Richard Daly and Security Supervisor, Theo Petropoulos.

Mr. Petropoulos stated, around 14:10 this afternoon there was a report that there was a News crew out at the intersection of Power House Road and Rocky Hill Road. Security Officer Hart was dispatched to the area and found a Channel 7 News Crew a female reported and a camera man.

Officer Hart was asked by Mr. Petropoulos to wait to take any action until he arrived. A minute or so later Mr. Petropoulos arrived. Mr. Petropoulos stated, he asked the female what she was doing and was told she worked for channel 7 News. With her was a black male holding a large video camera. Mr. Petropoulos stated, at that time a second female about 5'5 between 45 and 55 years of age walked up upon them coming from the entrance of 600 Rocky Hill Road. She was wearing a blue dress and had a close pilgrim sticker above her right breast. Mr. Petropoulos asked the female what she was doing and she said, she had walked down to the gate and had picked up the phone so she could have a tour. She was explained by Mr. Petropoulos, there was a public relation number she could call to make those arrangements. He also informed her walking past the Exclusion Area sign she was trespassing. Mr. Petropoulos asked the woman her name and she said, no. He then instructed the News crew and the other female they were trespassing and had to leave now. They said ok and started packing up when the woman in the blue dress asked Mr. Petropoulos his name and he told her he wasn't giving it to her. Then the news reporter asked him for a business card which he told he didn't have one, so he asked the news reporter if she had a business card. She then handed over her card which read Cheryl Fiandaca, 7 News.

At this point a man came walking up from the area to the entrance of 600 Rocky Hill Road. He was about 5'8 between 55 and 65 years of age. This man also had a close Pilgrim sticker on his chest. This man had some thing in his hand and when asked showed it was his inhaler. He was asked where he was coming from but he didn't answer.

Neither the man or the female was seen past the gate at 600 Rocky Hill Road. The woman was the only one who reported she went past the gate to call about a tour.

The news crew left in Mass. Reg [REDACTED] and the male and female left in [REDACTED], that vehicle came back to [REDACTED]

A picture was taken of the woman in the blue dress by security as she was talking to Mr. Petropoulos. Mr. Petropoulos and Mr. Daly had seen the picture and recognized the woman in the blue dress as Diane Turco who has been arrested a number of times in the past for trespassing.

Security Supervisor, Theo Petropoulos and Security Officer Steven Hart wrote an incident report and they were both given to me by Mr. Petropoulos along with a copy of the picture of Diane Turco. There was also a copy of Cheryl Fiandaca business card from 7 News.

This Officer took note that there was only two signs in area. Both were just before you go threw the gate leading into Entergy. The first one read Exclusion Area and right behind it another read Posted No Trespassing Authorized Personnel Only.

The five pages that was given to this Officer by Security Supervisor Theo Petropoulos was filled out on evidence form 6.02-1 and placed into the up stairs locker.

On August 22nd at approximately 16:20, this Officer made contact with Diane Turco by phone. I asked her if she could tell me what she was doing yesterday when she was at the Pilgrim/Entergy Power Plant. Ms. Turco stated, she was

Incident Number: 2014000020285

Page 3 of 4

PIFormSingle 10/10/13

Plymouth Police Department
20 Long Pond Rd
Plymouth, MA 02360
(508) 830-4218
Incident Report

Incident Number: 2014000020285
File No: N/A
Dispatch Incident Number: 2014000020285
Print Date: September 8, 2014
Printed By: esser

Narrative by: Clifton Brant (59CB) Division: Patrol/Detectives (continued)

<u>Date & Time</u>	<u>Narrative Description</u>	<u>Entered by</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Reviewed by</u>	<u>Last Edit Date</u>
08/21/2014 19:47		Clifton Brant (59CB)	Open		08/22/2014
	contacted by 7 News to do a story on the lack of security at the Pilgrim/Entergy Power Plant. Ms. Turco stated, 7 News just recently did a story on the Seabrook Power Plant. Ms. Turco stated, she walked down the main gate to the plant and used the phone at the end and walked back undetected. Ms. Turco stated, that is a problem. She advised me she didn't do it to blame anyone. It was just an awareness issues, that there is a problem, so someone could address it. At this time, I thanked Ms. Turco with speaking with me, and hung up the phone.				

Incident Dispatcher Remarks:

Create User ID: system

Date & Time

08/21/2014 16:45:05

2014/08/21 16:00 Ottino, Karen A360: caller requests officer in reference to past trespassing incident

2014/08/21 16:45 Ottino, Karen A360: see report